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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the impact of trade unions in the US and the UK and elsewhere. In
both the US and the UK, despite declining membership numbers, unions are able to raise wages
substantially over the equivalent non-union wage.  Unions in other countries, such as Australia,
Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal and
Spain, are also able to raise wages by significant amounts.  In countries where union wage
settlements frequently spill over into the non-union sector (e.g. France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands and Sweden) there is no significant union wage differential.  The estimates from the
seventeen countries we examined averages out at 12 per cent.
Time series evidence from both the US and the UK suggests three interesting findings. 
First, the union differential in the US is higher on average than that found in the UK (18 per cent 
compared with 10 per cent).  Second, the union wage premium in both countries was untrended
in the years up to the mid-1990s.  Third, in both countries the wage premium has fallen in the
boom years since 1994/95.  It is too early to tell whether the onset of a downturn in 2002 will
cause the differential to rise again or whether there is a trend change in the impact of unions.   It
is our view that most likely what has happened is that the tightening of the labor market has
resulted in a temporary decline in the size of the union wage premium.  Time will tell whether
the current loosening of the labor market, that is occurring in both countries, will return the
union wage premium to its long run values of 10 per cent in the case of the UK and 18 per cent 
in the case of the US.    On the basis of past experience it seems likely that they will.
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1. Introduction   
Union density has been in decline in the United States and Britain for two decades now 
(Appendix Table 1). It is often asserted by commentators that trade unions are outmoded 
institutions, shunned by employers and unable to reach a new generation of workers imbued with 
individualist values that are at odds with the ethos underpinning unionism.  But the propensity of 
individuals to join unions is not simply a question of “desire” or ideological commitment.  More 
broadly, one can think of union membership as a good – a product or service to be purchased.  
Employees derive utility from this good, as they would other services or products.  In the case of 
union membership, this utility can be psychological.  For example, the decision to purchase 
membership may be due to the desire to conform to a social norm and thus maintain one’s 
reputation among co-workers.  It may also be driven by instrumentalism, wherein employees 
think they have something tangible to gain from membership, either in terms of better wages, 
improved non-pecuniary terms of employment, or they may see it as insurance against arbitrary 
employer actions.  So, benefits may accrue to the individual, but they come at a cost. Employees 
will purchase membership if the benefits outweigh the costs.  A shift in the propensity to 
purchase union membership may reflect a shift in individuals’ perceptions of the costs and 
benefits attached to membership.  It does appear though that the cost of union membership is 
generally low.  Reynolds, Masters, and Moser (1999, p. 406) estimate that the fee required for 
membership is equivalent to roughly two hours’ pay per month while the cost of industrial action 
accounts for less than 1 per cent of working time for the typical union worker.  Neither has risen 
substantially over time. 
What of the benefits of membership?  Perhaps the most visible and most significant is the 
union wage premium or wage gap.  The most obvious way of measuring the value of union 
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membership to employees is to estimate the extent to which members’ wages are higher than 
those of similar non-members.  This union wage premium arises because unions bargain on 
members’ behalf for wages that are above the market rate.  In the literature what is usually 
estimated is the difference between the ceteris paribus earnings of union members and those of 
non-members.  That is, how much would wages change if an individual moved from non-union 
to union status or vice-versa, holding constant their individual and workplace characteristics.  
There has been speculation that the intensification of competition since the 1980s, coupled with a 
diminution of union bargaining strength, has prevented unions from obtaining the sort of wage 
premium they achieved in the past.  This is the issue we investigate in this chapter. 
 If the costs of membership have remained constant or risen, while the wage benefits of 
membership have fallen, this might help explain the reticence of employees to join unions.  
However, evidence to date is only suggestive of a declining union wage premium: there are few 
studies estimating the union wage premium with consistent time-series data and recent studies 
use techniques which were not used in earlier analyses.  This gap in the evidence is filled by the 
remainder of this paper.  In particular, we consider how much the premium varies by country, 
across groups and through time.  These issues are examined using broadly comparable time 
series data for the United States and the United Kingdom1.  The evidence suggests that there has 
been some constancy in the premium for most of the post-war years in both countries, although 
the level of the differential has been somewhat higher in the US than in the UK.  We find 
evidence that the union wage premium has declined steadily in both countries since the mid- 
1990s as the economies entered unprecedented boom periods and labour markets tightened 
dramatically2.  In addition, some evidence is presented on the size of the wage premium in 
seventeen other countries drawn from three continents – Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, 
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Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden.  
2.  Background 
There are two ways unions can affect wages in the economy (Farber, 2001).  The first is the 
direct effect on the wages of workers in jobs where wages are set through collective bargaining.  
This may affect non-members’ and members’ wages.  The second level is the impact that the 
presence of unions has in the economy: this can change the level and distribution of wages 
generally.  In theory, these general equilibrium effects may both raise and reduce the level of 
aggregate wages in the economy.  Since it is not possible to observe the counterfactual (wages in 
the absence of unions) this union effect is not easily estimable.  The union-non-union wage 
differential (the wage gap), defined as 
 
n
nu
W
WW −
=∆ ,                                                    (1) 
is estimable because we observe the wages of members ( uW ) and non-members ( nW ).  Provided 
differentials are small, this expression is usefully approximated by  
            nu ∆−∆≈∆ ,                                       (2) 
which says that the measured union wage gap is approximately equal to the difference in the 
proportional effects of unions on the union and non-union wage. The union wage gap in equation 
(1) can be usefully approximated by the difference in log wages, implying that  
           )ln()ln( nu WW −≈∆ .                                      (3) 
The union wage gap may reflect the direct effect of unions on the wages of unionised 
workers, and the offsetting effects on non-union workers.  Of course, there may be endogenous 
selection into union status arising for two reasons.  First, there is “worker choice” in which 
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workers only choose membership if the union wage is greater than the wage available to the 
individual outside the union.  It is often assumed that workers with a lower underlying earning 
capacity have more to gain from membership than higher quality workers, in which case this 
selection process will understate the union wage premium.  The second selection process arises 
through “queuing”, since not all workers desiring union employment can find union jobs.  Under 
this model, union employers may choose the best of the workers among those desirous of a union 
job.  This employer selection implies a positive bias in the union premium but, a priori, it is not 
clear whether this bias is greater or less than the negative bias implied by worker selection.  
Either way, if there is endogenous selection the membership mark up estimated using standard 
cross-sectional regression techniques ‘can be interpreted as the average difference in wages 
between union and non-union workers, but it can not be interpreted as the effect of union 
membership on the wage of a particular worker’ (Farber, 2001, p.  11).   
Causal inference is problematic because, where workers who become members differ 
systematically from those who do not become members in ways which might affect their 
earnings, independent of membership, we cannot infer the non-union wage for union members 
simply by comparing union members’ wages with those of non-members.  In the literature for 
the United States, the problem of selection bias is usually tackled by modelling union status 
determination simultaneously with earnings and estimating an econometric model that takes 
account of the simultaneity.  This usually involves a Heckman estimator where the earnings 
function and union status determination function are assumed to have errors that are jointly 
normal.  This technique relies on untestable exclusion restrictions whereby variables assumed to 
affect union status have no direct effect on earnings.  In his review of the literature, H. Gregg 
Lewis (1986) concluded that, because of these arbitrary functional form assumptions and 
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untestable exclusion restrictions, results from these studies were unreliable.  Estimates of the 
union wage gap using simultaneous equation methods tend to produce large and unstable 
estimates.  Panel estimates, which involve making use of data on the same individuals over time 
and observing how wages change as individuals alter their union status have problems of 
misclassification and measurement error which tend to result in estimates of the impact of unions 
that are downward biased.  Lewis (1986) takes the view that the most appropriate way to 
estimate the impact of unions on wages is using OLS.  He suggests OLS may produce an upper 
bound estimate of the true impact of unions because ‘such estimates suffer from upward bias 
resulting from the omission of control variables correlated with the union status variable’ (Lewis, 
1986, p. 9).  The assumption is that some of the wage gap attributed to union membership is, in 
fact, attributable in part to the characteristics of members, their jobs and their employers which 
would give them higher wages than non-members in any case.  In practice, as we note above and 
as other studies indicate (Farber, 2001; Robinson, 1989), bias in cross-sectional OLS estimation 
due to unobserved heterogeneity may both upwardly or downwardly bias the “true” impact3.  
Here, our primary concern is with changes in the union wage premium over time.  We do not 
seek to control for the potential endogeneity of union membership.  Rather, we adopt the 
standard approach to estimation of the union-non-union wage gap using individual-level data and 
estimating by OLS. That is, 
lnWit = Xitß + δUit + εit ,                                                        (4) 
where subscript it indexes individuals over time, itX  is a vector of worker, job and workplace 
characteristics, itU  is a dummy variable indicating union membership, and itε is a random 
component.  The parameter δ represents the average proportional difference in wages between 
union and non-union workers adjusted for worker and workplace characteristics, and it is the 
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regression-adjusted analogue of ∆ .  In our work, we assume that any bias in our estimates of the 
δ  over time arising through unobserved heterogeneity remains constant over time. 
 The vast majority of work estimating the effects of union membership on relative wages 
has been based on US data.  The definitive empirical works in this area are by H. Gregg Lewis, 
(1963, 1986), the father figure of this literature4.  The first of his two books measured the effects 
of unions using relatively aggregated data at the industry level, backed up by case study 
evidence.  In the 1986 volume, Lewis examined approximately 200 studies that had used micro-
data to estimate the effect of unions.  He concluded that it was not possible to use  “macro” data 
to estimate the union wage gap and that methodologically estimating an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) equation with wages on the left, and union status on the right with a group of controls, 
was probably the best way to estimate the size of the effect.  Panel estimates had problems of 
misclassification and measurement error while simultaneous equation methods suffered from 
poor identification due to a lack of suitable instruments.  Lewis (1986) found that the overall 
impact of unions in the US economy was approximately 15 per cent and showed relatively little 
variation across years – varying between 12 per cent and 19 per cent between 1967 and 1979.   
Subsequent work confirmed constancy of the differential until the 1990s.  For example, 
Hirsch and his co-authors have produced a series of papers estimating changes in the differential 
over time and concluded there has been some decline in the premium in recent years (e.g. Hirsch, 
Macpherson and Schumacher, 2002; Hirsch and Schumacher, 2002; Hirsch and Macpherson, 
2002).  Bratsberg and Ragan (2002) examine the trend in the private sector union wage 
differential in the US, 1971-99, and conclude that dispersion in the wage premium across 
industries has substantially declined as the US economy has become more competitive but that 
there has been only a modest decline in the average premium. Bratsberg and Ragan confirmed 
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the stability of the premium over time, as noted in Linneman, Wachter and Carter (1990), but did 
observe some evidence of a decline in the premium at the end of the 1990s.    
There are reasons to believe that the union wage gap might vary with the business cycle.  
If the union premium comes from employers sharing rents, it is plausible that the premium will 
be higher when those rents are higher, in which case the wage gap would be pro-cyclical.  
Alternatively, unions may insulate their members from the downward wage pressures workers in 
general face in more difficult times, in which case the wage gap may be counter-cyclical. In an 
interesting paper, Grant (2001) used panel data on individuals from the CPS from 1975 to 1993 
to examine the cyclicality of union and non-union wages over time.   He found that the union 
coefficients in the non-union sector for the two periods 1975-81 and 1983-93 were always 
procyclical and generally similar in the two periods. In contrast in the union sector Grant found 
strong procyclicality in the first period, confirming earlier evidence in Moore and Raisian 
(1980), but weak or no procyclicality in the union sector in the second period.  We come back to 
this issue later since we find evidence of a counter-cyclical wage gap in the US and UK in the 
1990s. 
Raphael (2000) used a sample of workers displaced by plant closings from the 1994 and 
1996 Current Population Survey Displaced Workers Supplement files to estimate the effects of 
union membership on weekly earnings. When models were estimated using the entire sample of 
displaced workers, longitudinal estimates of the union earnings effect were found to be similar in 
magnitude to estimates from cross-sectional regressions. In models estimated separately by skill 
group, the author found some evidence of positive selection into unions among workers with low 
observed skills and negative selection into unions among workers with high observed skills.  
Finally, Wunnava and Okunade (1996) used data for men from the Panel Survey of Income 
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Dynamics and found an overall union wage premium of about 12 per cent for the 1980s, which is 
a good deal lower than reported in most other studies and possibly driven by measurement error 
in the union status variable.  In response to fluctuations in local labour market conditions, 
proxied by the local unemployment rate, they found a much more flexible wage-setting process 
in the non-union sector relative to the union sector.  The long-term effect of unemployment on 
non-union real wages suggested an approximate 0.6 per cent decline for every one percentage 
point increase in unemployment, but the long-term effect of unemployment on real wages of 
union members was negligible.   Wunnava and Okunade’s estimates of the union wage premium 
ranged between 11.6 to 12.3 per cent for the sample period.  Union wages were found to be 
insensitive to short-run fluctuations in local labour market conditions, and counter-cyclical in 
nature.   
In the UK there have been approximately thirty studies, some based on establishment 
data5 and others on individual data (including some using linked employer-employee data)6.  It 
needs to be pointed out at the outset that industrial relations are rather more complex in Britain 
than they are in the United States.  For example, in Britain many more non-members work in 
workplaces that are covered by union agreements and, conversely, more union members are 
employed in workplaces where unions are not engaged in pay bargaining than is true for the US. 
There is, correspondingly, a multi-faceted literature in the UK which has investigated the free 
rider problem (see Booth and, Bryan, 2001; Hildreth, 2000) as well as the importance of union 
recognition (Blanchflower, 1984; 1986), multiple unionism (Machin, Stewart and van Reenen, 
1993) and closed shops (Stewart, 1987; Blanchflower, Garrett and Oswald. 1989; Metcalf and 
Stewart, 1992). (There are one or two papers in the US also on the role of coverage, including 
Budd and Na, 2000, and Schumacher, 1999.) Because we are interested in the benefits accruing 
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to individuals through their membership, this is not the path we will follow here: our main focus 
is a comparative one involving the benefits of union membership on wages.  
The recent spate of studies that have looked at the impact of union membership on wages 
has been occasioned by a growing belief that the union wage premium may be falling in Britain.  
Some argue that a decline in the average union premium is consistent with diminishing union 
influence over pay setting.  There is certainly evidence pointing in that direction.  First, case 
studies suggest the scope of bargaining has narrowed substantially in companies that continue to 
bargain with unions (Brown et al., 1998). Second, pay settlements in the private sector during 
1997/98 were no greater where trade unions were involved than in their absence (Forth and 
Millward, 2000b).  Third, even where managers say employees have their pay set through 
workplace-level or organisation-level collective bargaining, union representatives and officials 
are either not involved or are only consulted in a substantial minority of cases (Millward, Forth 
and Bryson, 2001).  But there is also evidence to the contrary.  For example, unions continue to 
have a substantial effect on pay structures, bringing up the wages of the lowest paid and thus 
narrowing pay differentials across gender, ethnicity, health and occupation (Metcalf, Hansen, 
and Charlwood, 2001).  These studies, which indicate union effects despite substantial declines 
in union density, might suggest that those unions that have survived are the stronger and, as such, 
better able to command a wage premium (thus raising the “batting average” of unions).  Here we 
briefly review what studies to date have told us about the size of the union wage premium over 
time and across workers. 
The consensus in the earlier literature was that the mean union wage gap was 
approximately 10 per cent (Blanchflower, 1999).  Despite the rapid decline in union density 
experienced in the UK since 1979, there was evidence to suggest that the gap remained roughly 
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constant from 1970 – the year for which the earliest estimate is available (Shah, 1984) – to 1995 
(see Blanchflower, 1999).  However, there is some dispute on this question, with some studies 
pointing to trends in either direction.  For instance, establishment-level analyses indicated that 
the union wage premium in the early 1980s was most evident where unions were strong, as 
indicated by the presence of a closed shop (Stewart, 1987).  This premium seems to have 
declined in the second half of the 1980s, a trend which has been attributed to a decline in the 
incidence and impact of the closed shop, coupled with unions’ inability to establish differentials 
in new workplaces (Stewart, 1995).   On the other hand, Andrews, Bell and Upward (1998) find 
the bargaining coverage differential over the period 1975-1994 moved counter-cyclically, with 
an underlying upward trend which they attribute to the decentralisation of pay bargaining. In 
addition to cross-sectional estimates, there has been a series of papers producing estimates for 
this period based on longitudinal data for Britain using the British Household Panel Survey 
(Blanchflower, 1999; Hildreth, 1999; Swaffield, 2001; Machin, 2001).  As noted earlier, and as 
both Lewis (1986) and Freeman (1984) pointed out, these estimates tend to be below the 
estimates obtained by OLS because of a downward bias induced by measurement error in the 
classification of union status.  As also noted earlier, OLS estimates may be upwardly biased if 
unobserved heterogeneity accounts for some of wage variation attributed to union membership.  
Thus, for example, in Blanchflower (1999) the OLS estimate for the years 1991-93 was 10.6 per 
cent compared with 3.7 per cent when a full set of people fixed effects were included.7  As 
Freeman (1984, p. 24) has suggested, it may well be that the cross-section and fixed effect or 
“panel” estimates of the impact of unions on wages ‘bound the true impact of unionism’. 
Studies using individual pay data covering the first half of the 1990s also suggested that, 
while the union effect was persisting, the premium declined for some workers (Blanchflower, 
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1999; Hildreth, 1999).  For example, Hildreth (1999, p. 7) argues that stability in the union 
premium for blue-collar male workers in 1991-95 compared with a declining premium for their 
white-collar counterparts may reflect their respective abilities to maintain their bargaining power.  
The picture emerging from research through to 1998/99 is suggestive of a more widespread 
decline in the premium.  Machin’s (2001) analysis of longitudinal data from the British 
Household Panel Survey indicates that, although there was a wage gain for people moving into 
union jobs in the early 1990s, this had disappeared by the late 1990s.  Booth and Bryan (2001) 
using linked employer-employee data for 1998 also found no significant wage premium.  Bryson 
(2002) finds a membership premium for covered workers, but it is much smaller than the 10 per 
cent common in the literature.  Furthermore, the premium is confined to employees in older 
workplaces and those with high union density.  Forth and Millward (2000a) find the premium 
was confined to workers in workplaces with high bargaining coverage or multiple unions. 
It would be hasty to assert, on the basis of this evidence alone, that unions’ ability to 
secure better than market rates for their workers has declined since the 1980s because 
methodological and data differences across studies make comparisons extremely difficult 
(Andrews et al., 1998).  It is even more difficult to establish what has happened to the trend over 
time.  As Lanot and Walker (1998, p. 343) note: ‘the existing literature says little about how the 
differential has changed over time there are so few studies it is difficult to take a view of whether 
there is any systematic movement over time’.  For instance, using standard regression techniques 
deployed in most studies, Booth and Bryan (2001, p. 12) identify a membership premium of 
roughly 10 per cent.  Bryson reports a similar regression-adjusted premium for the private sector 
(2002, p. 25).  However, in both cases, the authors lay emphasis on the results they obtain 
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through the use of other techniques (instrumental variables in the case of Booth and Bryan and 
propensity score matching in Bryson’s case).   
The disaggregated pattern of results reported by Lewis (1986) for the US appear to be 
broadly repeated for the UK.  The main exception is that the wage gap in the UK appears to be 
larger for females than it is for males (see Blanchflower, 1999; Main, 1996).  We explore this 
issue in more detail below. 
In what follows a series of estimates for the union wage gap since 1973 are presented.  
What is the size of the union wage gap in the UK and the US in the twenty-first century?  How 
much has it changed in the years since 1980, which is the end-point for Lewis’ 1986 study?  
How much do the estimates vary by gender, race and across the public and private sectors?  How 
large is the wage gap in other countries?  In the following three sections, micro-data on 
individuals are used to estimate log hourly earnings equations first for a group of seventeen 
countries and then for the US and the UK.  In the case of the US and the UK data are available 
over time that allow us to examine the time series properties of the union wage premium.  
Clearly, one would wish to examine the extent to which unions are able to influence the total 
compensation package including fringe benefits.  Unfortunately, relatively little is known about 
the extent to which unions are able to influence fringe benefits, primarily because of a lack of 
suitable data.  Such literature as does exist – most of which is for the US – suggests that these 
effects are large (see Freeman and Medoff, 1984, for the US; and Renaud, 1998, for Canada).  
For Britain, Forth and Millward (2000a) find unions enhance pension and sick pay provision in 
similar circumstances to those where they affect pay.  But our data files do not contain 
information that permit us to examine this issue over time. 
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Before moving to estimating union wage gaps, it is appropriate to place these results in 
the wider context of the changes in the labour market experience of the two countries over the 
last couple of decades; specifically, in terms of unemployment and employment; wage 
inequality, real wage growth and union density.  This allows for some appreciation of the climate 
in which unions have been operating.   
1.  Unemployment was generally higher in the US than it was in the UK from 1965 to 1980.  The 
picture reversed itself in the later period, 1980-99.  In 2000 and 2001 the unemployment rate in 
the UK was below that of the United States, averaging 3.4 per cent and 4.4 per cent, respectively 
(see Appendix Table 1).  Both employment and the size of the labour force increased rapidly 
over the period 1990-2000 in the US.  Over this period, employment in the US increased by 14 
per cent while the labour force increased by 12 per cent8.  The UK experienced smaller growth 
along both of these dimensions, with respective growth rates of 7 per cent and 3 per cent9. 
2.  Levels of earnings and wage inequality are high in the US and the UK compared with most 
other countries, and especially so in comparison with most European countries (Blanchflower, 
2000).  There was substantial growth in earnings inequality in the 1970s and 1980s in the US.  
Since the early 1970s earnings in the US have become much more unequal between more-skilled 
and less-skilled workers as well as between workers with high and low levels of education and 
those with many years of labour market experience compared to those with few.  For example, in 
1979 male college-educated workers earned on average 30 per cent more than male high-school-
educated workers.  By 1995 this premium for college-educated workers had risen to about 70 per 
cent (Blanchflower, 2000).  Earnings inequality declined in the UK in the 1970s but increased in 
the 1980s.  Only Britain and the United States have continued to experience a rapid rise in 
inequality into the 1990s, albeit at a slower rate than had occurred in the 1980s.  There is much 
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less evidence of rising wage inequality in other countries (see the various papers in Freeman and 
Katz, 1995).  Blanchflower (2000), for example, found that from 1973-1994/95 at the lower part 
of the distribution, the earnings of the median worker rose a lot in comparison to the worker at 
the first decile only in the UK and the US from a group of fifteen countries (Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, the UK and the US).  Appendix Table 2 presents four measures of inequality 
for most of these countries at various points in time, using data from the Luxembourg Income 
Study.  The measures reported are the Gini coefficient as well as the 90/10, 80/20 and 90/50 
differentials.  The table confirms the high levels of inequality in the US and the UK compared to 
other countries. 
3.  In the United States real wage growth has been much greater at the top of the earnings 
distribution than at the bottom.  In the hundred years to 1973, real average hourly earnings rose 
by 1.9 per cent a year.  Between 1973 and 1997, CPI-deflated real wages have fallen by about 
0.4 per cent a year.  The combination of flat average wages and rising inequality means that large 
numbers of American workers have experienced stagnation or even absolute declines in their real 
earnings in recent decades.  And workers at the low end of the earnings distribution have 
suffered the most, particularly those in the lowest decile.  For example, the real hourly earnings 
of high-school-educated males fell by 20 per cent from 1979 to 1993.10   In contrast, there has 
been considerable growth in real earnings at the top of the earnings distribution.  Senior 
managers and executives have experienced large increases in real earnings over the last couple of 
decades, and especially so when total compensation including stock options are included. 
In contrast to the United States, in most OECD countries (including the UK) there has 
been strong real earnings growth across the wage distribution.  For only one or two countries 
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(New Zealand and Australia) has a rise in earnings inequality implied weak growth or even 
declining real wages for workers at the bottom half of the earnings distribution11.  The low-paid 
in most industrial countries have experienced real earnings growth over the last two decades12.    
In a comparison of seven OECD countries (Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
the UK and the US), using data from the Luxembourg Income Study for the 1980s, Gottschalk 
(1993) shows that only in the US did the inequality of family income rise more than the 
inequality of earnings.  In these countries, government actions through social expenditures 
mitigated somewhat the impact of increasing wage inequality. 
4.  Union density rates declined steadily in the US from 197013.  In Britain density increased in 
the 1970s and then declined dramatically. Appendix Table 1 provides the background data. Since 
1991, there has been a decrease in union membership of 1.3 million, a fall over the ten-year 
period of 15 per cent.  The fall in union membership has been steeper for men than for women 
over the past decade: union density for men was 42 per cent in 1991 and 29 per cent in 2001, 
whereas that for women was 32 per cent in 1991 and 28 per cent in 2001.  There has been an 
even more pronounced decline in unionisation in Australia, where union density  was  45.6 per 
cent in 1986 but only 28.1 per cent in 1998.  Moreover, Australian union density continues to 
fall, with the latest estimate being 24.5 per cent14.  The decline in density has also been 
pronounced in Japan and Austria.  Some countries, including Denmark, Finland and Sweden, 
actually experienced increases in density over the period.  (For a discussion, see Blanchflower 
and Freeman, 1992; Blanchflower, 1996; Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1999, 2000.) 
 Section 3 sets the scene by presenting evidence on the size of union wage premia in 
seventeen countries.  In section 4 we make use of data from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) to obtain estimates of the impact of trade unions on hourly earnings for the US.  In section 
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5 data from the UK Labour Force and British Social Attitudes Surveys are used for direct 
comparison with the US experience.   Section 6 discusses the cyclical nature of the wage gap in 
the US and UK, and Section 7 presents our conclusions. 
3.  Union wage differentials around the world 
Over the past couple of decades there has been a growing body of literature estimating 
the size of the union wage gap outside the UK and the US.  There are a number of studies for 
Canada which suggest that the union wage gap is in the 10-15 per cent range (Doiron and 
Riddell, 1994; Robinson and Tomes, 1984; MacDonald and Evans, 1981; Lemieux, 1998; Kuhn 
and Sweetman, 1998, 1999; Donald, Green and Parsch, 2000; DiNardo and Lemieux, 1997).  
This estimate appears to have remained fairly constant over time15.  Renaud (1998) provided the 
first empirical evidence of the impact of unions on benefits and total compensation in Canada 
using micro data from the Canadian General Social Survey (GSS) of 1989.  His results suggest 
that the Canadian unions increased total compensation by 12.4 per cent, compared to an impact 
of 10.4 per cent on wages.  Even though the union impact on total compensation is 2 per cent 
greater than the impact on wages, given that benefits comprise only about 6 per cent of total 
compensation in this sample, the percentage impact of unions on benefits is estimated to be 45.5 
per cent.  This latter estimate implies a very substantial impact of unions on benefits in Canada,  
as large or larger than estimates for the US.   
In Australia the range is generally estimated to be between 7 and 17 per cent, with most 
estimates at the lower end of the range16.  Blanchflower and Machin (1996) provide estimates of 
union wage premia for Australia using the 1989/90 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations 
Survey (AWIRS90) where the establishment is the unit of observation.  They found significant 
wage differentials for labourers and unskilled workers of 15.6 per cent but no evidence of 
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significant differentials in respect of plant and machine operators, sales and personal service 
workers, clerks, tradespersons, para-professionals or professionals – along with evidence of a 
negative differential for managers.  More recently, Miller and Mulvey (1996) have reported 
evidence that union premia in Australia are small.  Using individual level data from the 1993 
Survey of Training and Education, they calculate the union wage effect to be 2.6 per cent for 
men and 1.6 per cent for women. Wooden (2001, p. 2) takes exception to this result and argues 
that previous research has understated the impact of unions ‘by focusing on differences across 
individuals rather than differences across bargaining units’.  Using data on 11,840 individual 
workers from 1,357 workplaces in the 1995 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 
(AWIRS95), Wooden showed that simply including a union membership dummy produces 
insignificant differentials for both men and women17.  However, Wooden found that at those 
workplaces where the majority of workers were covered by collective agreements a strong union 
presence conferred a wage advantage of the order of 15 to 17 per cent to members and non-
members alike relative to workers in workplaces where collective agreements had not been 
negotiated and where union wage effects were found to be small and insignificant.  This does 
seem to make some sense because in Australia union negotiated agreements and awards typically 
apply to both members and non-members within the same workplace, and in the case of awards 
to all workers within the same industry.  Further, Wooden and Bora (1998) use the AWIRS95 
data file and find that the wage premium associated with union membership in unionised 
workplaces (compared with non-union workplaces) is as high as 7.7 per cent.  They found this 
was only the case where (a) all workers at the workplace were union members and (b) where the 
union was relatively ‘active’. (An ‘active union’ is defined as one in which the senior delegate 
from the union with most members spends one hour or more each week on union activities, and 
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where a general meeting of members is held at least once every six months or delegates meet 
regularly with management.) 
Moll (1993) estimated the 1985 union premium in South Africa at 24 per cent for black 
blue-collar workers (19 per cent for black males and 31 per cent for black females) and 13 per 
cent for whites.  Schultz and Mwabu (1998) found that among male African workers in the 
bottom decile of the wage distribution, union membership was associated with wages that were 
145 per cent higher than those of comparable non-union workers; among those in the top decile, 
the differential was 19 per cent.   For South Korea, Park (1991) obtained estimates of 4.2 per 
cent for men and 5 per cent for women.  Wagner (1991) found significant positive union effects 
for blue-collar workers in Germany, while Schmidt (1995) found small but significant wage 
differentials of less than 6 per cent.  Neither Schmidt (1995) nor Schmidt and Zimmermann 
(1991) were able to find evidence of significant union wage gaps in Germany for male workers.  
(Table 1 near here) 
 In Table 1 we estimate union wage gaps for seventeen countries from three continents –  
Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden18.  The data used are from the 
1994-99 International Social Survey Program (ISSP)19.  The dependent variable is the log of 
earnings/wages/income with the exact measure used being variously defined across countries but 
consistent over time.  Included in each equation is a restricted set of controls: age, age squared, 
years of schooling, private sector, and union status.  The samples are restricted to employees 
only.  The small number of controls will imply that the estimated union effects reported here are  
biased.  Given that the same controls are used in each country in each year, our best hope is that 
such biases are constant over space and time.  The quality and size of the data files are not 
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comparable to those we use below for the US and the UK, and for that reason the reader is 
warned be cautious in interpreting these cross-country results.  The (unweighted) average 
differential across these countries is 12.1 per cent. 
Countries appear to fall into three groups.  The first group of just two countries has a 
wage differential in excess of 20 per cent, namely, Brazil (40 per cent) and Japan (29 per cent).  
The second group of ten countries have more modest, but still material, differentials of around 10 
per cent – Australia (13 per cent), Austria (16 per cent), Canada (9 per cent), Chile (17 per cent), 
Cyprus (15 per cent), Denmark (17 per cent), New Zealand (10 per cent), Norway (8 per cent), 
Portugal (20 per cent) and Spain (7 per cent).  Trade unions in the final group of five countries 
have no measured impact on the wage – France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden.  
In these countries, the union wage gap is zero primarily due to the fact that unions are also able 
to control wage outcomes in the non-union sector.    
(Table 2) 
Panels (a) and (b) of Table 2, which report union density rates for these countries and 
chart how they have changed over time, suggest a helpful way of classifying the observed 
differences in wage premia.   
1. Two countries with dramatic declines in density – Austria and Japan – have estimated 
differentials in double digits.  (Below we shall show the UK and the US are similar.)  In the case 
of Austria, it seems that a big increase in inequality accompanied this decline in unionisation (see 
Appendix Table 2).  Australia and New Zealand have declining density and a positive union 
wage differential, although it should be noted that the decline in unionisation in New Zealand is 
a very recent phenomenon (see Maloney and Savage, 1996; Maloney, 1998).  Portugal also has 
declining unionisation rates and a sizeable wage gap (see Blanchflower, 2001). 
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2. The distinguishing feature of the group of countries that have union wage premia of zero – 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden – is high levels of union coverage, and unions’ 
ability to influence wage setting in the non-union sector by extension of collectively bargained 
rates.  (France is an exception in that it has very low union membership rates but approximately 
100 per cent coverage.) It is also clear from Appendix Table 2 that, with the exception of Italy, 
income inequality is low in these countries. 
3. Four countries with significant differentials – Canada, Denmark, Norway and Spain – have all 
had constant or rising levels of union density over the last few decades20.   
4. Little is known about the labour market in Cyprus or Chile. According to our ISSP files, union 
density averaged 62 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively, in the two countries over the sample 
years.   
5. The large estimate for Brazil is based on a single year of data with few controls and less than 
1,000 observations and should be interpreted with caution.   
We now turn to an examination of union wage premia in the US and the UK, for which 
countries we have better quality data and more data points. The data will also permit us to 
examine movements in differentials over time. 
4.  Union wage differentials for the United States 
Table 3 presents estimates of the wage gap using separate log hourly earnings equations for each 
of the years from 1973 to 1981 using the National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER) May 
Earnings Supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS)21 and for the years since then 
using data from the NBER’s Matched Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) files of the CPS22.  
The MORG data for the years 1983-1995 were previously used in Blanchflower (1999)23.   For 
both the May and the MORG files a broadly similar, but not identical, list of control variables is 
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used, including a union status dummy, age and its square, a gender dummy, education, race and 
hours controls plus state and industry dummies24.   
(Table 3 near here) 
 The first and third columns of Table 3 report the union coefficient in log hourly earnings 
equations for the total sample and the private sector, respectively.  Hirsch and Schumacher 
(2002) have recently shown that there is what they call a ‘match bias’ in union wage gap 
estimates due to earnings imputations25.  They show that this bias arises because currently 30 per 
cent of workers in the Current Population Survey have earnings imputed using a “cell hot deck” 
method.  This means that wage gap estimates are biased downward when the attribute being 
studied (e.g. union status) is not a criterion used in the imputation.  They show that standard union 
wage gap estimates such as reported in Blanchflower (1999) are understated by about 3 to 5 
percentage points as a result of including individuals who have had their earnings imputed.  By 
construction, then, the individuals with imputed earnings have a union wage gap of zero; hence 
omitting them raises the size of the union wage gap.  Unfortunately, it is not a simple matter to 
exclude those individuals with imputed earnings in a consistent way over time26.  Here we follow 
the procedure suggested by Hirsch and Schumacher (2002).  All allocated earners are identified 
and excluded for the years 1983-88 and 1996-2001 in the MORG files. For 1989-95, allocation 
flags are either unreliable (in 1989-93) or not available (1994 through August 1995).  For 1989-
93, the gaps are adjusted upward by the average imputation bias during 1983-88.  For 1994-95, 
the gap is adjusted upward by the bias during 1996-98. Because the May CPS sample files 
available to us do not include allocated earnings in 1973-81, the series are adjusted upward by 
the average bias (of .033) found by Hirsch and Schumacher using these May CPS data for 1979-
81. Time-consistent estimates of union wage gaps, with match bias removed, are presented for 
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1973-2001 in the second and fourth columns of Table 3 for the economy as a whole and for the 
private sector, respectively.  These estimates are larger than those reported in the first and third 
columns of the table, which included individuals with imputed earnings27.  In each year there are 
approximately 160,000 observations for the US economy and 130,000 for the private sector in 
the MORG; in the May files, sample sizes are approximately 38,000 and 31,000 respectively 
until 1980 and 1981 when sample sizes fall to approximately 16,000 and 13,000, respectively, as 
from that date on only respondents in months four and eight in the outgoing rotation groups 
report a wage. 
(Table 4 near here) 
 Table 4 reports the estimated wage gaps derived by taking the antilogs of the coefficients 
in (the second and fourth columns of) Table 3 and deducting one.  Separate results are reported 
for the economy as a whole as well as the private sector.  Results obtained by Hirsch and 
Schumacher (2002) are also reported in the final column of the table.  A number of facts emerge: 
1. On average the wage differential over the period is approximately 18 per cent.  This compares 
with an average of just over 14 per cent when similar calculations are performed using the first 
and third columns of Table 3 which include workers with imputed wages28.    
2. The size of the union wage gap or mark-up is the same in the private sector as it is in the 
economy as a whole. 
3. There appears to be a decline in the size of the differential since 1995, as the US economy 
entered a boom period.  We later examine this issue in more detail as we find similar results in 
the UK. 
4. The private sector differentials we report in the second column of Table 4 are smaller than 
those obtained by Hirsch and Schumacher (2002) in the third column of the table.  Why?  It 
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appears the answer is because of the sensitivity of the union coefficient to changes in the 
controls. We illustrate this by pooling the MORG files, excluding those with imputed earnings 
data, for the six years 1996-2001 for the public and private sectors combined.  The union 
coefficient changes as follows as controls are added:  
  CPS MORG: 1996-2001 (n=663,564)  
1.  No controls except time      .321 
2.  + age, age2 + male .203 
3.  + race (4) .202 
4.   + education (15) .191 
5.   + usual hours .183 
6.   + organisational status (4) .201 
7.   + state dummies (50) .169 
8.   + industry dummies (50) .145 
9.   + 8 1-digit occupation dummies .157 
10.  replace 8 occupation dummies with 
       85 2-digit occupation dummies .185 
11.  Hirsch/Schumacher specification .199 
 (Age, age2, male, race (4), education (15),  
marital status (6), occupation (8), industry (9), region (8)) 
 
Only including time as a control (1996=0, 1997=1,…, etc.) produces a coefficient of .321.  
Progressively adding controls that are correlated with union status reduces the coefficient to .145 
in line 8, which is the specification we use in Tables 3 and 4.  In row 11 we report the 
specification used by Hirsch and Schumacher (2000), which includes many fewer controls than 
used in our preferred specification in line 8.  There is a large literature supporting the inclusion 
of controls for local labour market characteristics (e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994) and 
industry characteristics (e.g. Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey, 1998).  Adding occupation 
dummies, especially at the two-digit level, appears to raise the size of the differential by 
approximately 4 percentage points, confirming the point made by Hirsch and Schumacher 
(1998)29.  Our view is that it is not appropriate to include occupation controls here as they are 
likely nothing more than slices (deciles/percentiles?) of the wage distribution itself.  In private 
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correspondence, Barry Hirsch has disagreed with this view and argued that occupation dummies 
should be included because they reflect large differences in skill not controlled for by years of 
schooling and age.  Given that there is a large variation in individual union status within broad 
occupation groups, his view is that they may be an appropriate control.  There is no simple way 
to resolve this issue – it is a substantive point that does influence the level of the differential 
although it appears to have little effect on the time-series properties of the differential.  We have 
simply agreed to disagree on this one and let the reader decide.  As ever, the truth probably lies 
somewhere in between!   
 The results reported in Table 4 are broadly comparable to the estimates obtained by H. 
Gregg Lewis (1986) in his Table 9.7, which summarised the findings of 165 studies for the 
period 1967-79.  Lewis concluded that during this period the US mean wage gap was 
approximately 15 per cent.   His results are reported below30:   
Year         # studies           mean estimate         Year          # studies           mean estimate 
1967 20                          14%     1973            24                        15% 
1968 4 15%     1974              7                        15% 
1969 20 13%     1975            11                        17% 
1970 8 13%     1976              7                        16% 
1971 20 14%     1977             10                       19% 
1972 7 14%     1978               7                       17% 
       1979               3                       13% 
 
The left panel contains estimates for the six years prior to our starting point in Table 4.  It does 
appear that the unweighted average for this first period, 1967-72, of 14 per cent is slightly below 
that of the second interval, 1973-79.  The estimates for the later period are in turn somewhat 
smaller than those we obtained in Table 4 – which averaged 20 per cent – but appear to have the 
same time-series pattern; for example, 1979 has the lowest value in both sources.  In part, the 
low number Lewis obtained for 1979 is explained by the fact that the 1979 May CPS file 
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included allocated earners and hence the estimates were not adjusted for the downward bias 
caused by the imputation of the earnings data31. 
(Table 5 near here) 
Table 5 uses the same pooled MORG file as we used above to examine the sensitivity of 
the union coefficient to changes in controls for the years 1996-2001, but this time to measure 
disaggregated union wage gaps.  The first row entry of column 1 presents the union coefficient 
of .145 obtained from specification 8 above, which included a full set of controls except 
occupation.  The coefficient is exponentiated in column 4 giving an overall differential of 15.6 
per cent.  Reading down that column, estimates for males and females and the public and private 
sectors are broadly the same32, and union wage effects are higher for the young and the least 
educated, non-whites, part-timers, manual workers, and non-manufacturing.  These results are 
similar to those found by Lewis (1986), who concluded that the gap was greater for blacks than 
whites; in services than in manufacturing; for construction than for other non-manufacturing; for 
blue-collar workers than for white-collar; and for private- than for public-sector workers.  As do 
we, Lewis concluded that the estimates for men and women were approximately the same.  
Further, Lewis found that the wage gap fell as years of schooling, establishment or firm size and 
industry unemployment rates rose. For age, years of experience and years of seniority the gap at 
first fell and then increased.  The robustness of Lewis’s results were broadly confirmed by Jarrell 
and Stanley (1990) using meta-analysis, although their mean estimate of the wage gap for the 
period was a little lower than that obtained by Lewis.  There is very little new under the sun! 
 Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 report the results of including both a union variable and a 
union*time interaction term.  In all cases, the interaction term is negative and significant, 
implying for all groups a significant decline in the size of the premium between 1996 and 2001.  
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The penultimate two columns attempt to enumerate the scale of these declines.  In the fifth 
column headed ‘Wage gap 1996’ the union*time term is set to zero and the union coefficient is 
exponentiated (i.e. for row 1 antilog (.167-[.012*0] minus 1=18.2%)).  In the next column the 
same exercise is performed for the end year of 2001 when time=5.  Hence, in this case the 
calculation is (i.e. for row 1 antilog (.167-[.012*5] minus 1=11.3%), implying an overall decline 
of just under 7 percentage points in the differential between 1996 and 2001.  The decline has 
been greatest over the period among the most highly educated and in services (see the summary 
results in the final column of the table).  But all groups have experienced a substantial decline in 
the wage premium.  In 1996, the premium was above 15% for all but 3 of the 17 worker types.  
In 2001, it was below 15% for all but 3 of the worker types. 
 Is the relatively high differential in the US an artifact of sample selectivity?  In 
Blanchflower and Freeman (1992) it was argued that this is not the correct way to interpret the 
data and this is still our view.  The reasons given, which are still relevant, were as follows:   
1. Evidence within the US tends to reject the notion that union wage effects are large when union 
density is small.  Union wage differentials tend to be greater, the greater the extent of 
unionisation in the sector (see Lewis, 1986; Freeman and Medoff, 1984), presumably because 
this gives unions greater bargaining power. 
2. If selectivity were the major cause of the estimated large effects of unionism on wages in the 
US, similar differences in other labour market outcomes should be expected, which is not the 
case. 
3. Third, the fact that employers as well as workers affect union density makes the direction of 
the selectivity effect uncertain (Farber, 2001).  One might well argue that selectivity operates to 
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bias downward union wage effects as employers fight hardest against unions that have the most 
potential for raising wages and accept unions when they have the least potential. 
4. Massive employer opposition to unions in the US, but not elsewhere, is consistent with the 
union demand for higher wages being greater in the US than in other countries. 
All of this does not deny the possibility that our estimates may be contaminated by the 
reverse effects of density on wage differentials. But any such potential contamination is unlikely 
to reverse the finding that union wage differentials are relatively high for similar workers in the 
US relative to other countries.   
 An obvious question to ask is: why has union membership and union employment been in 
decline given the relative constancy of the union wage premium in the years up to 1995?  The 
level of the differential – at around 18 per cent – is still very high by international standards.  The 
United States decides union membership through an adversarial electoral process at plant level, 
which has evolved into a system where management has a greater say in unionisation outcomes 
than it does in other countries. The benefit to employers in removing unions from the workplace 
often outweighs the costs of doing so.  The costs to unions in organising recruitment drives is 
high:  Farber and Western (2001) estimate that in order to match the rate of union organising 
seen in the 1970s unions would have to organise 374,000 private sector employees a year, which 
is much more than is currently being achieved (99,000).  Their lower-bound estimate of the cost 
of doing so is $575.5 million per year, or about $64 per union member33.   Bender (1997) has 
further argued that the loss of economies of scale in union organising is an important factor in 
explaining union decline.  It is much harder for employers in other countries to get rid of unions 
than it is in the US.  Even in the UK there are only a very few examples of union de-recognition   
(Millward, Bryson and Forth, 2000).  Employers are unable to hide from a union; they have no 
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place to go. The decline in US unionism seems to have been driven by employer opposition, 
fueled by more competitive product markets, increased international trade and a favourable legal 
environment, as a result of which there have been smaller economic rents to be shared with 
workers than was true in the past34.  Linneman, Wachter and Carter (1990, p. 51) have gone 
even further and suggested that the evidence of a relatively constant aggregate union wage 
premium is a ‘statistical artifact’.  High premium industries, they show, have been increasing 
their union wage premia and losing employment shares and hence membership of trade unions.  
Union wage premia in private services, they argue, have held constant or fallen.  They argue that 
even though unions have been hurt by exogenous factors, which have created shifts in demand 
from goods to service-producing industries, they have been hurt most by the rising wage premia.  
Supporting evidence for this view is presented by Freeman (1986), who found a positive 
correlation between the union wage gap and a proxy for managerial opposition to unions, 
namely, the number of unfair labor practices per worker in NLRB elections.  Farber (1990) also 
concludes that the decline was principally a result of increased employer opposition to unions 
along with lower demand for union services by workers.   
The results in this chapter suggest that the union wage differential in the US is 
comparatively high, although there is now some, admittedly weak, evidence of countries with 
even larger effects (see above).  However, it is unclear how much weight should be placed on the 
latter estimates, which are based on small sample sizes.  The decline in union density in the US 
does not appear to be an aberration but is structurally rooted in what unions do on the wage front.  
Whereas in the 1950s and 1960s the large differentials that US unions gained were probably 
economically justified given the United States’ role as world economic leader, the increased 
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differentials that emerged in the 1970s still appear to be a major liability to the future 
development of unionism in the US. 
5.  Union wage differentials for the United Kingdom 
Evidence to date is merely suggestive of a declining union wage premium: there are few studies 
estimating the union wage premium with consistent time-series data, and recent studies use 
techniques which were not used in earlier analyses35. This gap in the evidence is filled by 
analyses of the union wage premium over the period 1985-2001 presented in Table 6.  We use 
two data sources: the Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the UK, and the British Social Attitudes 
Surveys (BSAS).  The LFS estimates tend to be above the BSAS estimates, but in both series 
there has been a decline in the log hourly union wage premium since 1994 (with the BSAS 
estimate for 1997 being an outlier, perhaps due to the much smaller sample that year).36  
Although the premium remains roughly 10 per cent in the 2000 LFS, it falls to a statistically 
insignificant 5 per cent in BSAS 2000, and falls even further in 2001.  Both series are based on 
standard specifications for each separate year (detailed in the notes to Table 6).  In identifying 
the union effect over time, we make what we think is the reasonable assumption that any bias in 
our estimates arising through unobserved heterogeneity is constant over time. 
 (Tables 6 and 7 near here) 
Table 7 presents log hourly wage estimates for the United Kingdom based on pooled 
years from the LFS37.  It adopts the same format and methodology as the CPS estimates 
presented in Table 5.  The purpose is to show the variation in the membership premium across 
types of worker, and how the downward trend in the premium since the mid-1990s has affected 
each group.  The fourth column of row 1 shows that, for the period 1993-2000, the hourly union 
wage premium across the economy was 9.9 per cent (n=105,112).  This figure is the 
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exponentiated coefficient based on the point estimate of .094 in the first column.  This point 
estimate for the union coefficient changes as follows as controls are added: 
UK – LFS files: 1993-2000 (n=105,000) 
 
1.  No controls except time .279 
2.  +age, age2 + male .185 
3.  + race .185 
4.  + education .118 
5.  + workplace size .074 
6.  + region dummies .097 
7.  + industry dummies .094 
8.  + 1 digit occupation dummies .103 
9.  + 2 digit occupation dummies .104 
 
The coefficient falls with the addition of new controls, particularly at stages 2 and then at 
stage 5 when workplace size is introduced.  However, it rises a little in stages 6 and 7, pointing to 
the fact that unobserved heterogeneity can both upwardly and downwardly bias estimates of the 
union wage premium.  As was found above for the US, the addition of 1- or 2-digit occupation 
dummies increases the size of the estimated union effect.  However, in contrast to the US, the 
size of the union effect does not rise as we move from 1-digit to 2-digit occupation dummies.   
Returning to Table 7, the entries in the fourth column show that the union premium is 
highest among manual workers, part-timers, and women. These are all groups with traditionally 
low earnings. Conversely, the premium is lowest among the traditionally higher paid, namely, 
men and the highly educated.  In the same way as described for the US data in Table 5, the fifth 
and sixth columns of Table 7 use the information generated by a union*time interaction – the 
data are reported in columns 2 and 3 – to show the premium in 1993 and 2000 for the whole 
economy and for seventeen sub-groups of employees.  In the whole sample, the wage gap 
dropped from 14.2 per cent in 1993 to 6.3 per cent in 2000. What is remarkable is the evidence 
of a large fall in the wage premium across most types of worker, indicated by the sub-group 
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regressions. In 1993 only one group of employees (the highly educated) had a premium well 
below 10 per cent.  In 2000, all but three out of the 17 types of worker had a premium below 10 
per cent.  Those worse affected were manufacturing workers, men, private sector workers and 
non-whites, all of whom had no significant premium by 2000. 
(Table 8 near here) 
Table 8 performs a similar task to Table 7, this time presenting differences in the union 
wage premium for Britain, but based on pooled years from the BSAS 1985-200138.  The first 
column shows that, for the period 1985-2001, the hourly union wage premium across the 
economy was around 9 per cent.  This point estimate for the union coefficient changes as follows 
as controls are added: 
BSAS files: 1985-2001 (n=17,934) 
 
1.  No controls except categorical time dummies .196 
2.  + 5 age dummies + female .149 
3.  + 7 education dummies .108 
4.  + full-time status + manual .111 
5.  + 6 workplace size dummies .068 
6.  + 6 region dummies .082 
7.  + manufacturing dummy .087 
 
The coefficient falls with the addition of new controls from stages 1 to 3, rises a little 
when full-time and manual status are controlled for, then falls substantially with the workplace 
size dummies, as happened with LFS.  Again, as with the LFS, the coefficient rises with region 
and industry dummies.  The sub-group analysis in the first column of Table 8 shows that, over 
the whole period, the wage premium was highest among manual workers, part-timers, those with 
low or no qualifications and women, again reflecting the LFS findings.  
The simplest way to show the impact of the declining union premium across types of 
worker in BSAS is to estimate the premium for each group before the decline occurred (1993-
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95), and then again at the end of the period (1999-2001).  These estimates are presented in the 
last two columns of Table 8.  In 1993-95, only two types of worker (non-manuals and the highly 
qualified) had a union premium of less than 10 per cent.  By 1999-2001, eleven types of worker 
had a premium of less than 10 per cent.  For five types of worker (men, younger workers, those 
in the private sector, non-manuals, and the highly educated) the membership premium was no 
longer statistically significant. 
Across the economy as a whole, the membership premium fell from 12.2 per cent in 
1993-95 to 5.1 per cent in 1999-2001.  What is interesting is the way that the premium collapses 
for some workers.  For instance, there has always been a ranking in the premium according to 
educational attainment, with membership raising the wages of the least qualified most.  This is 
apparent in the second column for the period 1993-95.  But what is striking is that, by 1999-
2001, the premium for the highly qualified is flattened.  Similarly, full-timers saw their premium 
plummet to a barely statistically significant (t=1.97) 3.3 per cent, while the premium held up well 
for part-timers.  The premium has also held up well in the public sector, among older workers, 
and among manual workers, but it has all but collapsed in the private sector, among younger 
workers, and among non-manuals. 
The case of male workers is unique.  The table shows that, whereas the premium was 
similar for men and women in the mid-1990s, it was considerably lower for men than for women 
by the end of the period.  However, the picture changes on introducing a public sector control.  
As note c to the table points out, the public sector dummy was omitted from the results presented 
because it was not available for the 1994 and 1995 surveys.  However, we reran all estimates 
including the public sector dummy for years where the public sector dummy was available to 
check the sensitivity of our results.  Calculating the premia for men and women for 1993 only 
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produces results similar to the 1993-95 pooled estimates but, with the public sector added to the 
pooled 1999-2001 analysis the male union premium is estimated to be 6.3 per cent, while that for 
women is 5.7 per cent.  Thus, once the public sector control is included, men’s and women’s 
membership premium is not significantly different in the later period.  This is because the public 
sector dummy is negative and significant in the case of men, but non-significant in the case of 
women.  The explanation is straightforward.  Because public sector employment and 
unionisation are highly correlated, in the absence of a public sector control the union 
membership dummy is picking up the negative wage differential of public sector workers among 
men.  For women, the addition of the public sector control makes no difference because there is 
no negative public sector wage differential among women. 
 
6.  The cyclical nature of the wage gap in the United States and the United Kingdom 
Figure 1a plots the point estimates of the union wage premium for the US, taken from the 
first column of Table 4, against unemployment for 1973-2000.  Figure 1b does the same for 
Britain for 1985-2001, using the data from the last column in Table 6.  In both countries the 
premium is counter-cyclical.   Regressions were then run for each of the countries with the union 
premium as the dependent variable – using the data from Table 4 for the US and Table 6 for the 
UK (when there were observations in a single year from both the LFS and the BSAS, the average 
of the two was used) for the years 1973-2001.  Each equation included a highly significant, and 
positive, US dummy.  The one year lag on the unemployment rate was significantly positive (t-
statistics are in parentheses) whether a lagged dependent variable was excluded (equation 5) or 
included (equation 6).  The level of unemployment was never significant and is excluded in the 
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equations below.  The time trend is also not significant. When the time trend was replaced by the 
union density rate that was also insignificant and the other results were the same: 
 Premiumt = 6.026 +  .700 Unemploymentt-1  -  .055time + 8.387US                                (5) 
                               (2.54)    (3.10)                               (1.04)         (9.22)            
                              (N=42, R2=.769) 
 
 
 Premiumt = 5.452 + .248Premiumt-1 + .511 Unemploymentt-1 - .079time + 6.108US       (6) 
                              (2.40)   (2.24)                    (2.21)                             (1.53)        (4.57)            
                           (N=42, R2=.797) 
 
These regressions support the notion that the union wage premium is counter-cyclical, 
moving positively with changes in the (lagged) unemployment rate.  Thus, as unemployment 
falls, as it has done since 1995, the union wage premium falls; and as unemployment rises the 
wage premium rises.  As the economy moves into boom the differential falls, and as it moves 
into recession the premium rises: unions are better for workers in slumps than they are in booms.  
Further, the insignificance of the time trend implies the premium is untrended.  So, contrary to 
what some commentators, particularly British ones, have been suggesting, it seems the recent 
decline in the union wage premium is not necessarily a secular decline, but a decline induced by 
favourable labour market conditions.  What this suggests is that, when demand for labour is 
strong, employees are less reliant on unions to bargain for better wages because market wages 
rise anyway.  However, when market conditions are less favourable to workers, the premium 
rises because union bargaining cushions members from market fluctuations.  So, although there 
are indications that the benefits of membership – as measured by the wage premium – have 
declined since the mid-1990s, this may be a cyclical phenomenon.  The premium may rise again  
in the face of deteriorating economic conditions currently being experienced at the time of 
writing (October 2002).  Furthermore, although it is possible that a decline in the net benefits of 
membership has induced a decline in union density, trends in the wage premium can only help 
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explain falling density since the mid-1990s, since the premium was fairly stable before that 
point.  In the years up to 1995 this could be a batting average effect.  As union density declines, 
the more powerful unions are the ones that remain. The weaker batsmen are removed from the 
batting order so the team's average rises.  Another possibility, of course, is that a high union/non-
union wage differential provides an incentive for employers to try and reduce union power.  The 
fact that the differential remained more or less constant in both the UK and the US for so long is 
a puzzle, particularly given the rapid declines in union membership in both countries.  The 
evidence is not consistent with the widely held view that union power has been emasculated.    
7.  Conclusions  
This paper has attempted to address the question: ‘what do unions do on the wage front?’  The 
answer in the cases of both the US and the UK is that, despite declining membership numbers, 
unions are able to raise wages substantially over the equivalent non-union wage.  Unions in other 
countries, such as Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal and Spain, are also able to raise wages by significant amounts.  In 
countries where union wage settlements frequently spill over into the non-union sector (e.g. 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden) there is, as one might expect, no 
significant union wage differential.  The estimates from the seventeen countries we examined 
averages out at 12 per cent. 
 Time series evidence from both the US and the UK suggests three interesting findings.  
First, the union differential in the US is higher on average than that found in the UK (18 per cent  
compared with 10 per cent).  Second, the union wage premium in both countries was untrended 
in the years up to the mid-1990s.  Third, in both countries the wage premium has fallen in the 
boom years since 1994/95.  It is too early to tell whether the onset of a downturn in 2002 will 
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cause the differential to rise again or whether there is a trend change in the impact of unions.   It 
is our view that most likely what has happened is that the tightening of the labour market has 
resulted in a temporary decline in the size of the union wage premium.  Time will tell whether 
the current loosening of the labour market, that is occurring in both countries, will return the 
union wage premium to its long run values of 10 per cent in the case of the UK and 18 per cent  
in the case of the US.    On the basis of past experience it seems likely that they will. 
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Table 1 
Union Wage Gaps for Various Countries, 1994-1999 
 
Country Years Union coefficient N Comments 
Australia 1994, 8 & 9 .118* 1,703  
Austria 1994, 5, 8 & 9 .150* 1,404  
Brazil 1999 .337* 803 No education or private   
Canada 1997-9 .083* 1682 No private sector dummy  
Chile 1998, 9 .159* 951  
Cyprus 1996-8 .137* 1,272  
Denmark 1997-8 .159* 1,058  
France 1996-8 .029 2,738  
Germany 1994 –9 .037 4,115  
Italy 1994, & 8 -.003 578  
Japan 1994-6, 8, 9 .258* 2,505  
Netherlands 1994 & 5 -.006 1,291  
New Zealand 1994-9 .099* 2,784 No private sector dummy 
Norway 1994-9 .073* 4,666  
Portugal 1998-9 .179* 970  
Spain 1995, 7-9 .069* 1,490 No private sector dummy 
Sweden 1994-9 -.002 3,619  
 
Notes: Dependent variable log of earnings variously defined. * indicates statistically significantly different from zero 
at the .05 level or better. Controls are age, age squared, years of schooling, private sector, hours and union status.  
Sample restricted to employees.  Germany includes East and West.   
Dependent variable defined as follows: 
Australia Yearly income in Australian $ 
Austria Respondent’s personal net income per month in Austrian Schilling 
Canada In what range would your own personal income fall in Canadian $ 
Chile Respondent’s monthly net income in CLP 
Cyprus Monthly gross earnings before taxes in Cyprus Pounds 
Denmark Respondent’s earnings per year before taxes in DKK 
France Respondent’s monthly earnings in Francs 
Germany Respondent’s net earnings per month after taxes and social insurance in DM 
Italy Respondent’s net income per month in thousands of Lira 
Japan How much did you earn yourself last year before taxes in thousands of Yen. 
Netherlands Respondent’s income after taxes in Guilder 
New Zealand Yearly income from all sources before tax in N.Z. $ 
Norway Personal gross income before taxes and allowances in 1997, incl. retirement benefits. etc. 
Portugal Respondent’s monthly average net income in Escudos 
Southern Ireland Weekly gross income before taxes and social insurance in Pounds  
Spain R’s monthly earnings in Pesetas 
Sweden Approximate income per month before taxes in SEK. 
 
Source: ISSP, 1994-99. 
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Table 2 
 
(a) Union Density Rates in European Countries, 1950-1998 (wage and salary workers)  
 1950 1960 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 
Austria 62 60 57 53 52 52 47 41 39 
Denmark 56 62 63 69 79 78 75 77 76 
France 30 24 20 22 22 19 14 10 10 
Germany (West) 38 35 32 35 35 34 32   
Germany            36 29 26 
Italy 45 28 37 48 50 42 39 39 38 
Netherlands 43 42 37 38 35 28 24 24 23 
Norway 45 52 50 52 55 56 56 55 55 
Portugal        52   40 30 25 
Spain      30   8 10 12 18 17 
Sweden 67 71 67 73 78 82 82 88 86 
 
Sources: Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000); Blanchflower (1996) 
 
 
 
(b) Union Density Rates in Non-European OECD countries 
 
 1970 1980 1990 1993 
Australia 44.2 49.9 40.8 35.0 
Canada 31.0 36.1 35.8 37.4 
Japan 34.7 30.8 25.2 24.2 
New Zealand 40.8 47.7 45.5 30.1 
 
Source: Blanchflower (1996). 
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Table 3 
Union Coefficients in a Log Hourly Wage Equation for the US, 1973-2001 
 
 All sectors Private sector 
 Imputed + Non-imputed Imputed + Non-imputed 
Year Non-imputed only Non-imputed Only 
1973 .132 .165 .120 .153 
1974 .136 .169 .129 .162 
1975 .141 .174 .134 .167 
1976 .144 .177 .136 .169 
1977 .174 .207 .168 .201 
1978 .172 .205 .171 .204 
1979 .121 .154 .119 .142 
1980 .130 .163 .124 .157 
1981 .116 .149 .118 .151 
1983 .151 .178 .160 .192 
1984 .158 .186 .169 .202 
1985 .150 .176 .160 .191 
1986 .151 .172 .160 .183 
1987 .146 .170 .152 .182 
1988 .145 .169 .145 .175 
1989 .139  .164 .146 .176 
1990 .133  .158 .132 .162 
1991 .124  .149 .124 .154 
1992 .140  .165 .146 .176 
1993 .145  .170 .149 .179 
1994 .135 .170 .126 .168 
1995 .126 .161 .124 .166 
1996 .125 .160 .126 .169 
1997 .126 .160 .123 .163 
1998 .113 .147 .105 .149 
1999 .103 .148 .096 .156 
2000 .092 .126 .092 .134 
2001 .091 .132 .087 .141 
 
Notes and Sources: Dependent variable is the log hourly wage.   
a) 1973-1981 May CPS, n=38,000 for all sectors, and n=31,000 for the private sector. Controls comprise age, age2, 
male, union, years of education, 2 race dummies, 28 state dummies, usual hours, private sector and 50 industry 
dummies. For 1980 and 1981 sample sizes fall to approx. 16,000 because from 1980 only respondents in months 4 
and 8 in the outgoing rotation groups report a wage. Since the May CPS sample files available to us do not include 
allocated earnings in 1973-81, the series in columns 2 and 4 are adjusted upward by the average bias of 0.033 found 
by Hirsch and Schumacher (2002) using these May CPS data for 1979-81. 
b) Matched Outgoing Rotation Group files of the Current Population Survey (MORGs), 1983-2001. Controls 
comprise usual hours, age, age2, 4 race dummies, 15 highest qualifications dummies, male, union, 46 industry 
dummies, 4 organisational status dummies, and 50 state dummies.  Sample is non-agricultural workers working at 
the time of interview, aged at least 16 years. For 1989-95 allocation flags are either unreliable (in 1989-93) or not 
available (1994 through August 1995). For 1989-93, the gaps are adjusted upward by the average imputation bias 
during 1983-88 (.031 in column 3). For 1994-95 the gap is adjusted upward by the bias during 1996-98 (.046 in 
column 3).  
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Table 4 
Union Wage Gap Estimates for the United States, 1973-2001 (%) 
(excludes workers with imputed earnings) 
 
 All sectors Private sector Private sector 
Year Blanchflower/Bryson Blanchflower/Bryson Hirsch/Schumacher 
1973 17.9% 16.5% 17.5% 
1974 18.4% 17.6% 17.5% 
1975 19.0% 18.2% 19.2% 
1976 19.4% 18.4% 20.4% 
1977 23.0% 22.3% 23.9% 
1978 22.8% 22.6% 22.8% 
1979 16.6% 15.3% 19.7% 
1980 17.7% 17.0% 21.3% 
1981 16.1% 16.3% 20.4% 
1983 19.5% 21.2% 25.5% 
1984 20.4% 22.4% 26.2% 
1985 19.2% 21.0% 26.0% 
1986 18.8% 20.1% 23.9% 
1987 18.5% 20.0% 24.0% 
1988 18.4% 19.1% 22.6% 
1989 17.8% 19.2% 24.5% 
1990 17.1% 17.6% 22.5% 
1991 16.1% 16.6% 22.0% 
1992 17.9% 19.2% 22.5% 
1993 18.5% 19.6% 23.5% 
1994 18.5% 18.2% 25.2% 
1995 17.4% 18.0% 24.5% 
1996 17.4% 18.4% 23.5% 
1997 17.4% 17.7% 23.2% 
1998 15.8% 16.1% 22.4% 
1999 16.0% 16.9% 22.0% 
2000 13.4% 14.3% 20.4% 
2001 14.1% 15.1% 20.0% 
1973-2001 average 18.0% 18.4% 22.4% 
 
Notes: Wage gap estimates calculated taking anti-logs and deducting 1. Columns 1 and 2 are taken from Table 3.  
Column 3 is taken from column 5 of  Table 4 of Hirsch and Schumacher (2002).   
 
Source: Data for 1973-81 are from the May CPS Earnings Supplements, and for 1983-2001 from the monthly CPS-
ORG earnings files. The Hirsch and Schumacher (2002) sample includes employed private sector nonagricultural 
wage and salary workers aged 16 years and above with positive weekly earnings and non-missing data for control 
variables (few observations are lost). The wage gap reported in column 3 is the coefficient on a dummy variable for 
union membership in a regression where the log of hourly earnings is the dependent variable. The control variables 
included are years of schooling, experience and its square (allowed to vary by gender), and dummy variables for 
gender, race and ethnicity (3), marital status (2), part-time status, region (8), large metropolitan area, industry (8), 
and occupation (12).  Because the sample does not include allocated earnings in 1973-78, the “not corrected” series 
are adjusted downwards by the average bias found during 1979-81 of .033 in column 3. All three columns include 
only workers reporting earnings.  All allocated earners are identified and excluded for the years 1973-88 and 1996-
2001. For 1989-95 allocation flags are either unreliable (in 1989-93) or not available (1994 through August 1995).  
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For 1989-93, the gaps are adjusted upward by the average imputation bias during 1983-88 (.031 in column 3).  For 
1994-95 the gap is adjusted upward by the bias during 1996-98 (.046 in column 3).  
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Table 6 
Time-Series Estimates of Union Wage Gaps, UK 
 
 LFS BSA 
1985  3.5% 
  (768) 
1986  11.1% 
  (1,418) 
1987  7.9% 
  (1,277) 
1989  6.3% 
  (1,329) 
1990  6.3% 
  (1,167) 
1991  4.8% 
  (1,097) 
1993 14.9% 11.4% 
 (8,391) (1,032) 
1994 17.5% 13.7% 
 (8,301) (1,345) 
1995 14.6% 13.1% 
 (9,008) (1,359) 
1996 14.8% 7.3% 
 (9,029) (1,432) 
1997 11.4% 17.7% 
 (18,227) (506) 
1998 12.2% 11.0% 
 (18,409) (1,336) 
1999 10.2% 9.5% 
 (17,357) (1,271) 
2000 10.3% 5.0% 
 (16,132) (1,426) 
2001  4.4% 
  (1,417) 
 
Sources: Data in the first column are from the UK Labour Force Surveys.  The controls comprise industry dummies, 
region dummies, age, age squared, highest qualification dummies, workplace size dummies, usual hours, race 
dummies, and a gender dummy.  Data in the second column are from the British Social Attitudes Surveys. Controls 
are gender, age, ethnicity, qualifications, manual worker, full-time worker, establishment size, public sector, 
manufacturing, and region. The BSAS estimates for 1994 and 1995 exclude the public sector dummy because this 
was not available in that year, while the 1991 estimates exclude the ethnic minority dummy due to the low number 
of valid cases with ethnicity in that year. In both series, the dependent variable is the log of the hourly wage. In the 
BSAS this is derived from the annual banded earnings data by taking the mid-point of the respondent’s earnings 
band and dividing this by continuous hours worked.  (The earnings band for the top-coded highest earners is closed 
by introducing an upper ceiling which is 1.5 times the lower band.) Before 1996, the BSAS hours worked question 
did not explicitly mention overtime hours. The hours denominator used here explicitly includes overtime hours from 
1996 onwards.  No BSAS surveys were conducted in 1988 and 1992. Numbers of observations are given in 
parentheses. 
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Table 8 
Disaggregated Estimates of the Union Hourly Wage Premium in 
Britain, 1985-2001 
 
 M(1): 1985-2001 M(2): 1993-1995 M(3): 1999-2001 
Whole sample  9.1% (17,934) 12.2% (3,756) 5.1% (3947) 
Men  6.1% (8,969) 11.5% (1,829) 1.8% (1,898) 
Women  11.2% (8,965) 11.6% (1,927) 7.5% (2,049) 
Age < 45 years  9.4% (12,082) 11.6% (2,557) 2.4% (2,681) 
Age 45+ years  8.2% (5,852) 13.0% (1,199) 10.1% (1,266) 
Private sector  7.1% (10,463) 10.1% (696) 3.6% (2,811) 
Public sector  10.0% (4,748) 14.7% (337) 10.6% (1,136) 
Manual worker  15.0% (6,925) 19.2% (1,406) 11.7% (1,410) 
Non-manual  5.6% (11,009) 8.4% (2,350) 2.0% (2,537) 
Manufacturing 9.6% (3,973) 13.1% (742) 10.0% (770) 
Non-manufacturing 8.5% (13,961) 12.1% (3,014) 4.3% (3,177) 
High education  4.7% (5,694) 8.5% (1,166) -0.9% (1,443) 
Medium education  9.4% (6,545) 10.6% (1,489) 8.1% (1,503) 
Low education  11.3% (5,536) 17.5% (1,056) 9.0% (965) 
Full-timer  8.0% (14,237) 11.9% (2,952) 3.3% (3,065) 
Part-timer  14.6% (3,697) 15.0% (804) 13.7% (882) 
 
Notes: 
a. Coefficients are exponentiated, depicting the difference in log gross hourly wages between members and non-
members, expressed as a percentage of non-members’ wages. Figures in parentheses are the number of 
observations in the model. 
b. The figures are derived from the union membership dummy coefficient in pooled regressions for the years 
stated. Specification M(1) pools the data for 1985-2001 and (where the sub-groups do not preclude their 
inclusion) they contain the following controls: grouped years, gender, age, qualifications, manual worker, full-
time worker, establishment size, manufacturing, region, grouped year dummies. M(2) is the same as M(1), but 
excluding the grouped year variables, for the period 1993-95; M(3) performs the same calculation for the most 
recent period, 1999-2001. 
c. Surveys in 1994 and 1995 did not collect information on sector, so M(2) for public and private sector equations 
is run for the 1993 data only. We tested the sensitivity of results to the inclusion of a public sector dummy in 
models. Where significant, these are reported in the text. 
d. All estimates are based on unweighted data.  
e. The dependent variable is the log of the hourly wage. Using the mid-point methodology, this is derived from the 
annual banded earnings data by taking the mid-point of the respondent’s earnings band and dividing this by 
continuous hours worked. (The earnings band for the top-coded highest earners is closed by introducing an 
upper ceiling which is 1.5 times the lower band.) Before 1996 the BSAS hours worked question did not 
explicitly mention overtime hours. The hours denominator used here explicitly includes overtime hours from 
1996 onwards.  
f. No surveys were conducted in 1988 and 1992.  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using pooled  British Social Attitudes Surveys, 1985-2001.  
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Figure 1a. Movements in the Wage Premium in 
the US, 1973-2001
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Figure 1b. Movements in the Wage Premium in Britain, 1985-2001
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Appendix Table 1 
Union Density and Unemployment in the UK and the US, 1964-2001 
 
 Union density (%) Unemployment rate (%) 
 US UK US UK 
1964 29.3 44.1 5.2  
1965 28.9 44.2 4.5  
1966 28.4 43.6 3.8  
1967 28.3 43.7 3.8  
1968 28.2 44.0 3.6  
1969 28.0 45.3 3.5  
1970 27.8 48.5 4.9  
1971 27.2 48.7 5.9 2.4 
1972 26.6 49.5 5.6 2.7 
1973 26.6 49.3 4.9 1.9 
1974 26.2 50.4 5.6 1.9 
1975 24.6 51.7 8.5 2.9 
1976 24.5 52.0 7.7 3.9 
1977 24.1 53.6 7.1 4.2 
1978 23.4 54.3 6.1 4.1 
1979 24.4 54.5 5.8 3.8 
1980 23.3 52.8 7.1 4.8 
1981 21.7 49.9 7.6 7.6 
1982 21.0 47.9 9.7 9.0 
1983 20.3 46.7 9.6 9.9 
1984 19.1 45.3 7.5 10.1 
1985 18.2 44.0 7.2 10.3 
1986 17.7 42.8 7.0 10.5 
1987 17.3 42.8 6.2 9.4 
1988 17.0 42.2 5.5 7.6 
1989 16.6 41.5 5.3 5.9 
1990 16.3 40.1 5.6 5.5 
1991 16.3 38.2 6.8 7.6 
1992 16.0 36.1 7.5 9.2 
1993 16.0 35.4 6.9 9.7 
1994 15.7 33.9 6.1 8.8 
1995 15.1 32.3 5.6 7.6 
1996 14.7 31.5 5.4 7.0 
1997 14.2 30.4 4.9 5.3 
1998 14.1 29.9 4.5 4.5 
1999 14.0 29.6 4.2 4.2 
2000 13.6 29.5 4.0 3.6 
2001 13.5 29.1 4.8 3.2 
 
Notes and Sources: 
a. US: The 1983–2000 Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG) earnings files, the May 
1973–81 CPS earnings files, and the Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations, various years.  
Hirsch, Macpherson, and Vroman (2001). 2001 number from BLS  
        (http://stats.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm),  nonagricultural wage and salary workers. 
 
b. UK: 1964-92, Visser (1996) and Golden, Lange, and Wallerstein (1997). From 1995, source is Brook (2002).    
Figures for 1993 and 1994 are authors' interpolations using overlap in the Visser and Brook series in 1991 and 
1992 for the UK and Britain. UK figures are union density among employees in employment. UK 
unemployment is based on the ILO definition  
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Appendix Table 2 
 Income Inequality Measures 
 
Country Year Gini coefficient Percentile Percentile Percentile 
   ratio ratio ratio 
   (90/10) (90/50) (80/20) 
Australia 1981  0.281  3.93  1.86  2.48  
Australia 1985  0.292  3.97  1.87  2.55  
Australia 1989  0.304  4.19  1.94  2.59  
Australia 1994  0.311  4.33  1.95  2.76  
Austria 1987  0.227  2.89  1.62  1.98  
Austria 1995 0.277 3.73 1.79 2.33 
Belgium 1985  0.227  2.73  1.62  1.96  
Belgium 1988  0.232  2.77  1.63  1.97  
Belgium 1992  0.224  2.76  1.62  1.96  
Belgium 1997 0.255 3.26 1.73 2.16 
Canada 1971  0.316  4.79  1.89  2.70  
Canada 1975  0.289  4.27  1.80  2.44  
Canada 1981  0.284  4.05  1.83  2.42  
Canada 1987  0.283  3.89  1.84  2.35  
Canada 1991  0.281  3.78  1.82  2.33  
Canada 1994  0.285  3.87  1.85  2.39  
Canada 1997 0.291 4.01 1.86 2.45 
Canada 1998 0.305 4.13 1.88 2.51 
Denmark 1987  0.254  3.22  1.60  2.12  
Denmark 1992  0.236  2.85  1.55  2.02  
Denmark 1995 0.263 3.18 1.63 2.19 
Denmark 1997 0.257 3.15 1.62 2.18 
Finland 1987  0.209  2.59  1.51  1.86  
Finland 1991  0.210  2.63  1.53  1.83  
Finland 1995  0.226  2.68 1.59  1.90  
France 1979  0.293  3.47  1.87  2.22  
France 1981  0.288  3.40  1.88  2.25  
France   1984  0.292  3.46  1.93  2.27  
France  1989  0.287  3.46  1.82  2.24  
France 1994  0.288  3.54  1.91  2.23  
Germany 1973  0.271  3.22  1.81  2.12  
Germany 1978  0.264  3.11  1.78  2.06  
Germany 1981  0.244  2.89  1.79  2.03  
Germany 1983  0.260  3.11  1.79  2.10  
Germany 1984  0.249  3.01  1.71  2.06  
Germany 1989  0.247  2.94  1.70  1.99  
Germany 1994  0.261  3.18  1.74  2.10  
Italy 1986  0.306  4.05  1.97  2.51  
Italy 1991  0.289  3.76  1.85  2.49  
Italy 1995  0.342  4.77  2.02  2.76  
Netherlands 1983  0.260  2.94  1.86  2.10  
Netherlands 1987  0.256  2.94  1.82  2.07  
Netherlands 1991  0.266  3.02  1.73  2.11  
Netherlands 1994  0.253  3.15  1.73  2.15  
Norway 1979  0.223  2.76  1.58  1.88  
Norway 1986  0.233  2.92  1.62  1.96  
Norway 1991  0.231  2.79  1.58  1.90  
Norway 1995  0.238  2.83  1.57  1.95  
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Spain 1980  0.318  4.37  2.02  2.60  
Spain 1990  0.303  3.96  1.97  2.46  
Sweden 1975  0.215  2.73  1.53  1.92  
Sweden 1981  0.197  2.43  1.51  1.76  
Sweden 1987  0.218  2.71  1.51  1.89  
Sweden 1992  0.229  2.78  1.59  1.91  
Sweden 1995  0.221  2.61  1.56  1.76  
UK 1969  0.267  3.23  1.84  2.17  
UK 1974  0.268  3.41  1.76  2.21  
UK 1979  0.270  3.53  1.80  2.34  
UK 1986  0.303  3.79  1.94  2.53  
UK 1991  0.336  4.67  2.06  2.95  
UK 1995  0.344  4.57  2.10  2.84  
US 1974  0.318  4.92  1.90  2.65  
US 1979  0.301  4.67  1.86  2.64  
US 1986  0.335  5.71  2.04  3.04  
US 1991  0.336  5.55  2.06  3.03  
US 1994  0.355  5.85  2.15  3.11  
US 1997  0.372  5.57  2.14  3.03 
 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study; downloadable at http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures/ineqtable.htm  
All figures relate to disposable income. 
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Appendix Table 3 
Log Hourly Earnings Equations for the US, 1996-2001 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All Private sector Public sector Men Women 
Union .145 .150 .134 .143 .135 
 (85.18) (68.85) (47.03) (61.85) (52.97) 
Age .045 .045 .0478 .055 .036 
 (173.5) (158.2) (73.14) (143.3) (103.7) 
Age2   -.0005 -.0005 -.0005 -.0006 -.0004 
 (146.5) (134.5) (60.64) (120.7) (88.30) 
Male .151 .157 .123 N/a n/a 
 (126.0) (116.5) (47.33)   
State government -.145 n/a -.141 -.149 -.147 
 (36.41)  (34.01) (25.71) (26.58) 
Local government -.131 n/a -.138 -.137 -.133 
 (34.79)  (34.04) (25.40) (24.85) 
Private for profit -.077 .080 n/a -.031 -.120 
 (21.04) (30.47)  (6.14) (22.89) 
Private non-profit -.165 n/a n/a -.222 -.157 
 (39.94)   (34.81) (6.42) 
Black -.009 -.012 -.009 -.015 -.004 
 (7.20) (7.93) (2.99) (7.71) (2.09) 
American Indian -.052 -.082 .015 -.075 -.032 
 (9.66) (12.25) (1.65) (9.51) (4.36) 
Asian or Pacific Islander -.101 -.105 -.079 -.120 -.075 
 (31.61) (30.27) (10.04) (26.62) (16.89) 
Hispanic -.112 -.125 -.033 -.130 -.090 
 (50.42) (51.81) (5.89) (42.21) (28.17) 
Usual hours .004 .005 .002 .003 .005 
 (76.00) (76.70) (11.65) (40.77) (63.43) 
      
N 663,564 546,793 116,771 333,188 330,376 
R2 .4655 .4609 .4546 .4581 .4436 
Adjusted R2 .4654 .4607 .4540 .4579 .4434 
 
Notes: All equations also include time 15 schooling dummies, 50 state dummies and 50 industry dummies.  
Excluded categories are federal government and white. Private sector excludes the self-employed. |t|-statistics are 
given in parentheses. 
 
Source: CPS Matched Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) files. 
union membership: an analysis of data from the autumn 2001  DAVID: D
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Appendix Table 4 
Log Hourly Earnings Equations for the UK, 1993-2000 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All Private sector Public sector Men Women 
Union .094 .052 .127 .035 .147 
 (28.07) (11.41) (24.54) (7.25) (31.73) 
Age .066 .068 .053 .088 .046 
  (94.43) (84.34) (35.89) (85.55) (48.90) 
Age2 -.0007 -.0007 -.0006 -.0009 -.0005 
 (82.43) (73.25) (31.91) (74.99) (43.10) 
Male .181 .195 .158 n/a n/a 
 (55.90) (49.81) (28.20)   
Black Caribbean  -.076 -.116 -.020 -.128 -.047 
  (4.61)  (5.26) (0.85) (4.87) (2.27) 
Black - African    -.191 -.189 -.186 -.272 -.134 
  (7.67) (5.81) (5.17) (7.27) (4.12) 
Black - other    -.122 -.105 -.133 -.210 -.072 
  (3.30) (2.11) (2.55) (3.75) (1.49) 
Indian    -.101 -.122 -.045 -.094 -.107 
  (7.96) (8.23) (1.85) (5.23) (6.05) 
Pakistani    -.110 -.165 .067 -.143 -.043 
  (4.94) (6.43) (1.57) (4.91) (1.28) 
Bangladeshi    -.264 -.395 -.121 -.364 .005 
  (6.09) (7.89) (1.43) (6.86) (0.07) 
Chinese     -.033 -.018 -.067 -.076 .010 
 (0.99)  (0.46) (1.12) (1.39) (0.25) 
Other race    -.030 -.021 -.034 -.049 -.022 
  (1.98) (1.17) (1.38) (2.19) (1.10) 
11-19 employees .082 .076 .078 .101 .060 
 (14.51) (11.74) (6.44) (11.24) (8.47) 
20-24 employees .091 .083 .080 .106 .072 
 (12.18) (9.35) (5.68) (8.98) (7.57) 
Don’t know but < 25  .040 .031 .049 .066 .003 
 (3.38) (2.25) (2.06) (3.82) (0.16) 
25-49 employee .118 .116 .090 .135 .096 
 (22.34) (18.82) (8.32) (16.64) (14.05) 
Don’t know but >24 .083 .084 .049 .100 .062 
 (6.49) (5.37) (2.06) (5.66) (3.42) 
>=50 employees .177 .183 .127 .203 .149 
 (43.03) (38.83) (13.99) (31.93) (28.49) 
N 105,112 75,000 29,712 51,544 53,568 
R2 .4537 .4524 .4256 .4487 .4273 
Adjusted R2 .4530 .4514 .4230 .4472 .4259 
 
Notes: All equations also include time, 40 schooling dummies, 19 region dummies and 60 industry dummies.  
Excluded categories are 1-10 employees and white. Private sector excludes the self-employed. |t|-statistics are given 
in parentheses. 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey files.  
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Appendix Table 5 
Log hourly earnings equations for Britain, 1985-2001 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All sectors Private sector Public sector Men Women 
Union .087 .069 .095 .059 .106 
 (12.30) (6.50) (6.69) (6.29) (9.88) 
Age 25-34 .272 .280 .258 .310 .239 
 (23.83) (19.59) (11.27) (19.85) (14.37) 
Age 35-44   .363 .374 .335 .455 .276 
 (30.61) (24.90) (14.41) (28.54) (15.76) 
Age 45-54   .370 .377 .362 .462 .281 
 (29.73) (23.42) (15.22) (27.34) (15.43) 
Age 55 or more   .375 .384 .339 .427 .309 
 (24.91) (19.43) (12.02) (22.20) (13.18) 
Female -.261 -.286 -.240 n/a n/a 
 (34.44) (26.98) (18.46)   
Full-time .126 .169 .064 .021 .127 
 (10.99) (10.31) (3.46) (0.51) (10.38) 
Manual   -.255 -.250 -.277 -.287 -.225 
 (29.55) (22.53) (16.09) (25.38) (16.59) 
10-24 employees   .108 .089 .081 .082 .123 
 (7.98) (5.35) (2.63) (4.34) (6.58) 
25-99 employees   .146 .159 .063 .141 .151 
 (12.02) (10.48) (2.20) (8.28) (8.88) 
100-499 employees   .182 .211 .097 .205 .158 
 (14.56) (13.46) (3.35) (11.85) (8.88) 
500 or more employees   .257 .317 .117 .279 .231 
 (19.38) (17.94) (4.02) (15.40) (12.05) 
Manufacturing   .062 .047 .115 .067 .044 
 (7.55)  (4.74) (3.08) (7.07) (2.87) 
N 17,934 10,463 4,748 8,969 8,965 
R2 .51 .53 .55 .50 .49 
 
Notes: All equations also include 5 categorical time dummies, 7 highest qualification dummies, and 6 region 
dummies. Excluded categories are aged 18-25 years and 1-9 employees. Confined to employees in employment 
working 10 or more hours per week. Public/private sector status unavailable in 1994/95, so these two years are 
excluded from the public and private sector equations. |t|-statistics are given in parentheses. 
 
Source: British Social Attitudes Surveys 1985-2001. 
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Endnotes 
 
1  Some of the estimates are for Great Britain which, unlike the UK, excludes Northern Ireland.  
Estimates are similar whichever geographical area is chosen. 
 
2  We have no micro-data since 2001 when labour markets loosened and the unemployment rate 
started to rise again in the United States.  
 
3  Wessels (1994) has cogently argued that OLS will not necessarily provide an  upper limit 
estimate.  His argument is that, provided a union has a certain degree of bargaining power, 
union-won increases in the wage that lead the firm to hire more able workers will be followed by 
further union actions to raise the wage.  Knowing this and given repeated bargains, the firm will 
not necessarily hire more able workers. 
 
4 Kaufman (2002) discusses the extent to which this empirical work on union wage 
determination fits the various economic models of union wage determination that have been 
developed since the work of Dunlop and Ross. His conclusion is pessimistic.  
 
5 See Blanchflower (1984, 1986), Stewart (1987), Blanchflower and Oswald (1990), 
Blanchflower, Oswald and Garrett (1990), Stewart (1990, 1991, 1995), Metcalf and Stewart 
(1992), Machin, Stewart, and Van Reenen (1993), Blanchflower and Machin (1996), Forth and 
Millward (2000b).  
 
6  See Stewart (1983), Shah (1984), Green (1988), Symons and Walker (1988), Blackaby, Yaron 
(1990), Murphy, and Sloane (1991), Blanchflower (1991), Main and Reilly (1992), Murphy, 
Sloane, and Blackaby (1992), Main (1996), Lanot and Walker (1998), Andrews et al. (1998), 
Andrews, Bell and Upward (1998), Blanchflower (1999), Hildreth (1999, 2000), Forth and 
Millward (2000a), Millward, Forth, and Bryson (2001), Swaffield (2001), Machin (2001), Booth 
and Bryan (2001), Bryson (2002), Forth and Millward (2002).  
 
7 Unfortunately the BHPS data file is very small in size with only around 4,000 workers present 
in consecutive waves and hence there are very few individuals that change status from year to 
year.  This means there are severe limitations to using BHPS to compare the sensitivity of union 
wage gap estimates to differences in methodology as in Andrews et al. (1998). 
 
8  Source:  Statistical Abstract of the US, 2002, Table no. 567 downloadable at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/01statab/stat-ab01.html  
  
9  Source: UK Office of National Statistics.   Downloadable from 
 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/TSDtimezone.asp  
 
10 Freeman (1995) and Mishel and Bernstein (1994) report declines of this magnitude. 
 
11 For more information on changes in real wages, see OECD (1996) and Katz, Loveman, and 
Blanchflower (1995) for the UK, the US, France and Japan. 
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12  See OECD (1996). 
 
13  Interestingly enough, Canada with many of the same firms and trade unions as the US has not 
seen declines in density: 1970=31%, 1980=36.1%; 1990=35.8%; 1993=37.4% (see Visser, 
1996).  
 
14  We thank Mark Wooden for providing us with these numbers.  
 
15  Further examples of studies for Canada are Simpson (1985), who found 11% for 1974; Grant, 
Swidinsky, and Vanderkamp (1987) who reported 12-14% for 1969 and 13-16% for 1970. 
 
16  Australian studies include Kornfeld (1993), who found 7-10% for young people between 1984 
and 1987; Mulvey (1986), who obtained estimates of 7% for women and 10% for men using a 
1982 sample; Christie (1992) who obtained an estimate of 16.6% using OLS and 17.2% using 
simultaneous equation methods with 1984 data; and   Blanchflower and Freeman (1992) who 
report 8% for the period 1985-87.  
 
17  In footnote 36 below we make use of individual level data from a similar survey undertaken in 
the UK, namely, the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey.  
 
18 In Blanchflower (1996) union wage gap estimates were obtained based on similar data and 
specifications for the following countries (where * indicates not significantly different from 
zero):   
                 %  
Australia    9.2  
Austria             14.6 
Canada               4.8* 
Germany    3.4 
Ireland              30.5 
Israel     7.0* 
Italy      7.2 
Japan              47.8 
Netherlands    3.7* 
New Zealand    8.4 
Norway    7.7 
Spain     0.3* 
Switzerland    0.8* 
 
The very large estimate for Japan appears to arise because of the lack of controls for 
workplace/firm size.  Some of the estimates are based on only a few hundred observations and so 
care has to be taken in interpreting these results. 
 
19  Details of the ISSP surveys, data and manuals are available at www.issp.org.  The data files 
are also available through ICPSR at the University of Michigan at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu.  
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20  Troy (2000) has argued that union density in Canada has remained as high as it has due to the 
expanded role of the public sector and quasi-public sector organizations (particularly in health 
care).  Troy shows that private sector density – in contrast to that in the public sector – has 
declined albeit at a somewhat slower rate than in the US. 
 
21 The May extracts of the CPS extracts in Stata format from 1969-1987 are available from the 
NBER at http://www.nber.org/data/cps_may.html  
 
22 Hirsch, Macpherson, and Schumacher (2002) have compared union wage gap estimates 
obtained from the BLS quarterly Employment Cost Index (ECI) constructed from establishment 
surveys and from the annual Employer Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC) with those 
obtained using the CPS.  They find that union/non-union wage trends in the three series ‘are 
consistent neither with each other nor with the CPS’, and ultimately conclude  that ‘we find 
ourselves relying most heavily on results drawn from the CPS’ (Hirsch, Macpherson, and 
Schumacher, 2002, p.23).  
 
23  There was no CPS survey with wages and union status in 1982.  
 
24  Following Mincer, it is more usual to include a term in potential experience rather than a 
direct measure of age.  We use education, however, for reasons of comparability as the CPS 
Outgoing Rotation Group files from 1993 report qualifications rather than years of schooling.  
 
25  We do not deal here with a further problem identified by Card (1996) of misclassification of 
self-reported union status in the CPS, first identified by Mellow and Sider (1983).  Card 
concludes that about 2.7% are false positives and 2.7% are false negatives.  Given that there are 
more non-union workers than union workers, this means the union density rate is biased 
upwards.  See Farber (2001) for a discussion and a procedure to adjust the union density rate for 
error.  In 1998, the observed private sector rate of 9.7% translates to an adjusted rate of 7.4% (the 
figures for 1973 were 25.9% and 24.5% respectively).   
 
26  The number of wage observations followed by the percentage imputed in parentheses (hourly 
+ non-hourly paid) in the NBER MORG are given below.  Note in 1995 allocation information is 
only available on one-third of wage observations, hence the small sample. 
 
1979 171,745 (16.5%)      1986 179,147 (10.7%)     1993 174,595 (4.6%)  2000 161,126 (29.8%) 
1980 199,469 (15.8%)     1987 180,434 (13.5%)     1994 170,865 (0%)  2001 171,533 (30.9%) 
1981 186,923 (15.2%)     1988 173,118 (14.4%)     1995   55,967 (23.3%)   
1982 175,797 (13.7%)     1989 176,411 (3.7%)     1996 152,190 (22.2%) 
1983 173,932 (13.8%)     1990 185,030 (3.9%)     1997 154,955 (22.2%) 
1984 177,248 (14.7%)     1991 179,560 (4.4%)     1998 156,990 (23.6%) 
1985 180,232 (14.3%)     1992 176,848 (4.2%)     1999 159,362 (27.6% 
 
27  We thank Barry Hirsch for helpful discussions on these issues.  All errors are ours of course 
and not his!  
 
28  Bratsberg and Ragan (2002) found an average premium in the private sector of 16.8%, 1971-
99, using a set of control variables similar to those used by Hirsch and Schumacher (2002).  
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29  There was essentially no difference in the results when two-digit occupation dummies were 
replaced with three- digit dummies (results not reported). 
 
30 There is a dissonance between the estimates Lewis offers by way of summary in his 
introductory chapter and those given in his Table 9.7 which are produced here (Lewis, 1986, p. 
9)  
 
31 Lewis (1986) had 35 studies using the CPS, 1970-1979; 16 studies using the 1967 Survey of 
Economic Opportunity; 25 studies using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1967-78; 15 
studies using Michigan Survey Research Center survey data other than the PSID, including the 
1972-73 Quality of Employment Survey; 22 studies using the National Longitudinal Surveys of 
1969-72; and 8 studies exploiting other sources. 
 
32  Full equations for the US as a whole as well as disaggregations by gender and broad sector are 
reported in Appendix Table 3.  
 
33  Even activism on this scale would yield a steady state private sector unionisation rate of just 
6.4% (Farber and Western, 2001, p. 27).  
 
34  For further discussion on this point, see Blanchflower and Freeman (1992).  
 
35  Blanchflower (1999) estimated union wage premia for the UK using the same methods as 
used here for the period  1983-94 using data from the same sources as used here plus the British 
Household Panel Survey for 1991-93 and the 1983 General Household Survey and found 
evidence of a constancy of the differential at approximately 10%. 
 
36 Further support for the proposition that the BSAS 1997 point estimate is an outlier comes from 
the authors’ calculations of the log hourly wage premium using the same methodology 
(unweighted estimates of the mid-point earnings) for individual level data from the Workplace 
Employee Relations Survey 1998, the fieldwork for which spanned 1997 and 1998.  The raw 
membership premium is .226 (25.4%).  This shifts with the addition of controls as follows: + 
demographics = .121; + job = .114; + establishment = .076; + geographical = .091.  In short, 
these estimates also point to a premium of around 10% in 1997/98. 
 
37 Full equations for the economy as a whole, private and public sectors, and for men and women 
are reported in Appendix Table 4. 
 
38 Full equations for the economy as a whole, private and public sectors, and for men and women 
are reported in Appendix Table 5.  
 
